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The Duty of Good Faith and Security 
of Performance* 
H O Hunter 
John Carter's paper provides a good discussion of many fundamental 
problems associated with the satisfactory enforcement of contractual 
obligations. In reviewing the various subtopics of the conference, he 
posits a scale of 'security' for performance that runs from simple reliance 
on the promisor's word to that of the chattel or real property mortgage 
with maximum rights of self-help in the promisee. In this commentary on 
his paper, I will argue that the greatest security for any promisee remains 
the word of the promisor and that this is so for reasons beyond those of 
honour. First, the duty of good faith imposes on contracting parties an 
obligation, independent of their mutual covenants, to perform their 
undertakings. Second, this same duty of good faith often imposes 
limitations on the self-help remedies of a secured party, especially when 
it is coupled with the general dislike of forfeiture. Third, the duty of good 
faith is consistent with the usual expectations of contracting parties in a 
commercial setting who rely more often on the development of long term 
relationships of trust and predictable performance than on the security 
of proprietary interests. 
The focus in this paper is on the experience in the United States. I am 
most familiar with those cases. As the sole American representative 
among the commentators, it seems appropriate for me to provide a 
perspective from this vantage point. The Uniform Commercial Code has 
been one of the greatest influences in the development of the doctrine of 
the duty of good faith in the United States. It has a direct bearing on 
many commercial contracts involving American parties, and the structure 
of the code is apparent in the Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods which now has been ratified by many important trading nations.1 
The modern doctrine of good faith in contractual obligations derives 
from Judge Cardozo's famous opinion in Wood v Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon,2 in which he said that the contract at issue was 'instinct with an 
obligation, imperfectly expressed' of good faith in performance. A legal 
* Being a Commentary on J W Carter, 'Problems in Enforcement', a paper delivered at 
the Second Annual JCL Conference, London, September 1991. 
1 At last count, 31 nations had adopted or ratified the convention. An up-to-date list is 
available from the United Nations Treaty Office in New York by mail or by telephone 
at (212) 963-3918. 
2 222 NY 88, 118 NE 214 (1917). Lady Duff-Gordon was a fashion designer who gave 
Wood an exclusive right to use her name for a year as an endorsement of the works of 
others (clothes, fabrics, etc) in return for a share in the profits from the sale of these 
'designer' items. Wood determined that she was allowing others to use her name on 
other products. He claimed breach of contract. She defended by arguing that there 
was no contract; Wood had not agreed to do anything. In holding for Wood, Judge 
Cardozo reasoned that implicit in the undertaking was a promise by Wood to use 
reasonable efforts to promote the goods to which Lady Duff-Gordon's name was 
19 
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historian would be quick to point out that this notion has its origins in 
works such as Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica,3 but for present 
purposes it is sufficient to limit discussion to the twentieth century. The 
Cardozo opinion has been relied upon and quoted in so many American 
cases that it has become an integral part of contract law throughout the 
United States. 
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code were equally explicit. 
Section 1-203 provides that 'every contract or duty within this Act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement'. 
In the article on sales, s 2-103 incorporates the standard of honesty in 
fact and of fair dealing in every contract made by a merchant.4 The 
general principle appears in many guises throughout the UCC. 
The Convention on the International Sales of Goods (CISG) does 
not contain an explicit reference to the principle of good faith, but there 
are references to standards of reasonableness, trade custom, and 
intentions of the parties which give an interpreting body the opportunity 
to develop a rule similar to that of good faith under the UCC.5 The CISG 
applies to all transactions involving the sale of goods between parties in 
states which have adopted the convention, but it leaves many issues to 
domestic law.6 Parties to a contract may choose to 'opt out' of the 
coverage of the CISG and adopt the domestic law of one or the other or 
leave the question of applicable law to the usual choice of law rules.7 
There is no mechanism for common interpretation of the CISG, and 
there is the likelihood that different courts in different jurisdictions may 
interpret and apply its provisions inconsistently. There was an attempt to 
mix together elements from the civil and common law traditions, and 
there is every reason to believe that the judicial approach to the CISG 
may be strikingly different in, for example, United States courts and 
those in Austria or Finland. American familiarity with the principle of 
good faith under the UCC and terms of interpretation such as 'trade 
practice', 'course of performance', and 'reasonable under the 
circumstances' could easily lead to the judicial introduction of a 
consistent standard of good faith in transactions governed by the CISG. 
(cant) attached. In his view, any other conclusion would have made no sense because the 
parties would not have gone to the trouble to negotiate a deal without the expectation 
of reasonable efforts by each party to bring about the desired result. 
3 See eg F Pollock and F W Maitland, History of the English Law, 2nd ed, 1903, Vol 2, 
p 195 ff; Hamilton, 'The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor', (1931) 40 Yak L J 1133. 
4 UCC s 2-104(1) defines a merchant as one who has special knowledge or who regularly 
deals in goods of the kind involved in the transaction. 
5 See, eg art 7, 8, and 9 which contain the general rules of interpretation. 
6 It does not deal with third party beneficiaries. There are no rules on creditor rights or 
those of bona fide purchasers for value. The CISG does not include definitions of 
trade terms nor any regulation of disclaimer clauses. See generally, Honnold, "The 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods', 
(1979) 27 Am J Comp L 201; H O Hunter, Modem Law of Contracts, Cum Supp 1991-1, 
para 27.01. 
7 Article 6. This article also provides that the terms of the contract displace any 
inconsistent provisions of the CISG. This may lead to confusion. By mentioning an 
alternative law of sales without explicitly 'opting out' of the CISG, it is unclear 
whether the CISG would or would not apply. 
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Although this may be less likely elsewhere, those who deal with trading 
partners in the United States should be aware that our courts might treat 
the CISG as an international version of art 2 of the UCC for reasons of 
familiarity and to maintain some consistency with the domestic law of 
sales. 
Does the term 'good faith' have substance or is it simply a label? One 
prominent American judge has argued that the term simply means the 
absence of 'bad faith'.8 However, the overwhelming majority of 
American courts and commentators agree that the term has independent 
meaning and substance. At the very least it imposes an obligation on 
each party to use reasonable efforts to bring about a successful 
conclusion to the agreement.9 This is more than a duty to refrain from 
acts that might interfere with the success of the transaction or that might 
breach a covenant. Even if a contract includes a provision which grants 
an express power to one of the parties, the exercise of that power may 
violate the obligation of good faith if its exercise could interfere with the 
performance of the other party.10 
The argument that good faith is nothing but the absence of bad faith 
is not only inconsistent with the weight of the law but also makes little 
sense. Acts that constitute 'bad faith' often are tortious and will give rise 
to independent grounds of liability. Refraining from 'bad faith' means 
doing nothing more than refraining from committing a wrong. The 
obligation of good faith, by comparison, reinforces the traditional sense 
of promissory duty and the mutual expectations of the parties. It is 
consistent with a policy favoring the performance of agreements — a 
policy that generally is in accord with the intentions of most contracting 
parties. In the commercial area, it supports the development of a 
merchant's standard of reasonableness within a trade and is consistent 
8 When he was a member of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the implied obligation of good 
faith derived from the Lady Duff-Gordon case is no more than an 'implied obligation 
not to engage in the particular form of conduct which, in the case at hand, constitutes 
"bad faith"'. See Tymshare Inc v Covell 727 F 2d 1145 at 1152 (DC Cir 1984). As a 
member of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia has little influence on the 
development of the common law of contracts nor on the interpretation and 
application of the UCC. Members of lower federal courts do have a surprisingly large 
influence on contract law because of diversity jurisdiction. Article III of the 
constitution grants jurisdiction to the federal courts (concurrently with state courts) of 
cases involving disputes between citizens of different states. By statute the amount in 
controversy must be at least $50,000, but a substantial number of disputes arising 
either ex contractu or ex delicto wind up in the federal courts. The Supreme Court, 
however, rarely grants review in appeals from diversity cases unless the dispute 
involves a substantial question under a federal law or the federal constitution. 
9 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, s 231 (1981); E A Farnsworth, 'Good Faith 
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code', (1963) 30 U Chi L Rev 666; Bailey v Chattem Inc 684 F 2d 386 (6th Cir 1982). 
10 Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Elizabethtown Inc v Coca-Cola Co 668 F Supp 906 at 920 
(D Del 1987). The court applied the standard of UCC s 2-103 to the contract in 
dispute even though it was not a contract within the coverage of the UCC. American 
courts commonly use the UCC by analogy in deciding cases not covered by the UCC. 
This practice expands the code beyond its intended scope, but it adds to the 
consistency of commercial law. 
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with the use of interpretive tools such as course of performance, trade 
practice, and so on. 
The obligation of good faith extends to all levels of performance, 
including the enforcement of security interests.11 The decision in the case 
of KMC Corp v Irving Trust Co,12 demonstrated the strength of this 
principle. After negotiations, Irving Trust, a major New York bank, 
issued a discretionary line of credit for $3.5m to KMC and took back a 
security interest in KMCs inventory and accounts receivable. KMC 
could draw on request, subject to a formula. The bank retained the 
power to deny requests for withdrawals if the bank 'felt insecure'.13 
KMC began to experience business difficulties, and Irving Trust refused 
to advance funds under the line of credit. Subsequently, the bank allowed 
some withdrawals, but KMC was unable to overcome its difficulties and 
the business collapsed. KMC blamed its failure on the cutoff of the line 
of credit and sued Irving Trust for breach of the implied obligation of 
good faith in the contract. KMC argued that Irving Trust acted hastily 
and without proper concern for KMCs cash flow demands. The court 
agreed with KMC which won a verdict for $7.5m, despite evidence 
proffered by the bank regarding the concerns of its lending officers about 
KMCs creditworthiness. 
The result in the KMC case was extreme. Not many courts are likely to 
deal as harshly with a commercial creditor who has serious doubts about 
extending more credit to a commercial borrower which is suffering 
business reversals. The decision has come in for some sharp criticism.14 
Nevertheless, it illustrates the strength of the good faith principle in the 
context of contract performance and the tenuous nature of a security 
interest. 
11 See generally, Andersen, 'Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts', (1988) 
73 Iowa L Rev 299. 
12 757 F 2d 752 (6th Cir 1985). 
13 In financing agreements it is common for the lender to demand the inclusion of an 
'insecurity' clause. Although this does not give the lender blanket authority to 
terminate credit or to foreclose on a security interest, it does allow the lender to limit 
credit whenever there is a reasonable concern for the continued creditworthiness of 
the borrower even if there has been no act of default as defined by the contract or by 
governing law. 
14 In the words of one commentator: 'KMC presents a troublesome precedent to all 
lenders who extend credit payable on demand. Demand obligations allow lenders to 
evaluate their credit and collection risks and to evaluate the administrative and legal 
costs associated with such financing. Loose application of an undefined and unlimited 
good faith performance obligation to the simple act of calling a demand obligation 
could seriously harm the ability of lenders to make proper evaluation of such risks and 
costs, and thus could jeopardise the continued availability of that type of financing. 
Faced with uncertain risks and potentially enormous liabilities arising from the 
collection of such obligations, lenders likely will be forced to change the terms and 
increase the cost at which such financing is made available to borrowers. This result 
would be detrimental both to lenders and borrowers.' Comment, 'Lender Liability for 
Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith Performance' (1987) 36 Emory LJ 917 at 933. 
See also Sahadi v Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co 706 F 2d 193 (7th Cir 
1983); Warren v Ford Motor Credit Co 693 F 2d 1373 (11th Cir 1982); Alaska State Bank 
v Fairco 674 P 2d 288 (Alaska 1983). 
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The more common examples of the good faith principle at work in the 
performance of contracts has been in connection with conditions to 
performance or in connection with 'best efforts' provisions, either 
express or implied. American courts, in general, require that a party use 
reasonable efforts to bring about a condition precedent or subsequent 
whenever the occurrence or non-occurrence of the condition may be 
affected by a party. For example, an agreement to buy a house 
conditioned on securing a loan imposes a duty on the buyer to try to 
obtain a loan.15 The buyer does not have to go to extraordinary lengths, 
but must make a reasonable effort. Depending on the jurisdiction, one 
application to a lender may be enough,16 but some courts have required 
two or more.17 
Requirements and outputs contracts have been a fertile field for the 
development of standards of good faith as courts have considered 
disputes about what are reasonable demands by one party or the other. 
The obligation of good faith often is the means by which courts find 
enough certainty in such contracts to enforce them.18 Much the same is 
true of contracts that contain a provision requiring performance to the 
'satisfaction' of one party or the other. A variation on the notion of good 
faith has led to the virtual demise of the perfect tender rule in the United 
States.19 
Contracting parties who seek to enforce rights under a contract 
regularly find themselves subject to the good faith rule. The KMC case 
discussed above is an example of the liability that may flow from an 
attempt to enforce what appears to be a straightforward self-help 
remedy. Limitations on the power to use contract based means of 
enforcement or remedies may arise under the rubrics of estoppel or 
15 See eg Kirya v Bulls 404 So 2d 58 (Ala Ct App 1981); Smith v Evans 620 SW 2d 627 
(Tex Civ App 1981); Manning v Bleifus 272 SE 2d 821 (W Va 1980). If the buyer makes 
a good faith effort and cannot obtain financing that is reasonable within the context of 
the market, then the condition fails and the contract is void. Stan Weber & Assocs Inc 
v Goodlett 402 So 2d 745 (La Ct App 1981). 
16 See eg Luttinger v Rosen 164 Conn 45, 316 A 2d 757 (1972); Lynch v Carroll 24 Wash 
App 667, 604 P 2d 510 (1979). 
17 See eg Fry v George Elkins Co 162 Cal App 2d 256, 327 P 2d 905 (1958); Hanover Ltd 
v Fields 568 P 2d 751 (Utah 1977). 
18 See UCC s 2-306 and especially Official Comment 2. The commentary to s 2-103 also 
is instructive. It states in part: 'A shutdown by a requirements buyer for lack of orders 
might be permissible when a shutdown merely to curtail losses would not. The 
essential test is whether the party is acting in good faith. Similarly, a sudden expansion 
of the plant by which requirements are to be measured would not be included within 
the scope of the contract as made but normal expansion undertaken in good faith 
would be within the scope of this section'. 
19 The leading case creating a standard of objective reasonableness in place of the 
perfect tender rule was Jacob & Youngs Inc v Kent 230 NY 239, 129 NE 889 (1921). The 
UCC includes a perfect tender rule in s 2-601, but it must be read in connection with 
other sections, such as 2-508 which gives the seller time to cure a nonconforming 
tender. The perfect tender rule of the UCC is itself subject to the good faith standard. 
See eg Printing Center of Terns Inc v Supermind Publishing Co 669 S W 2d 779 (Tex Civ 
App 1984). 
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waiver,20 but the point is essentially the same. Courts prefer that 
contracts be performed in line with the mutual expectations and 
aspirations of the parties and they abhor a result that smacks of 
forfeiture. 
The rule that a 'material' breach is required before the other party can 
justify nonperformance is related to the principle of good faith. What 
constitutes a 'material' breach varies with the circumstances, but this 
rule, like the preference for almost any result other than forfeiture, puts 
a premium on the performance of agreements rather than on their 
termination. It also acts as a brake on parties who might be disposed to 
seek technical perfection as a justification for avoiding their own 
obligations.21 
There is some confusion between breach of the obligation of good 
faith and what some courts refer to as 'bad faith breach of contract'. The 
confusion has developed largely from a series of cases involving 
insurance policies. Insurers owe a duty of good faith to their policy 
holders that is close to a fiduciary obligation. The breach of this duty can 
lead to substantial liability and often cases based on a breach of this duty 
are considered to be claims arising ex delicto which may support the 
recovery of punitive damages.22 In the American system insurance cases 
form a special subcategory of contract cases with rules peculiar to the law 
of insurance, and the industry is subject to heavy regulation. Most 
insurance decisions do not provide useful precedents for other contract 
disputes, but in some jurisdictions the courts have applied the breach of 
the duty of good faith rules to non-insurance cases. To a greater or lesser 
extent, this has been true in California,23 Indiana,24 and Montana.25 
Missouri comes close, but the major decision on point is ambiguous.26 
Montana courts have taken the extreme position that breach of the 
duty of good faith in a contract can give rise to a claim for both 
compensatory and punitive damages. In Flanigan v Prudential Savings & 
Loan Association,27 an employee of 28 years sued for wrongful 
termination even though she was an employee at will with no 
employment contract. The court held in her favour and reasoned that: 
(1) the length of her service with the firm created a reasonable 
20 Sometimes a court will not be able to avoid the terms of the contract but will find a 
separate basis, such as reliance or restitution, to do justice. 
21 For a good discussion of the material breach issue, see Andersen, 'A New Look at 
Material Breach in the Law of Contracts', (1988) 21 UC Davis L Rev 1073. 
22 See generally, H O Hunter, Modem Law of Contracts, 1986, ch 11 and Cum Supp 
1991-1. 
23 See eg Seaman's Direct Buying Service Inc v Standard Oil Co of California 36 Cal 3d 752, 
686 P 2d 1158, 206 Cal Rptr 354 (1984) where the court stated that 'a party may incur 
tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself from 
liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists'. 
For a discussion of the case see Comment, 'Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: 
Seaman's Direct Buying Service Inc v Standard Oil Co' (1985) 69 Minn L Rev 1161. 
24 See eg Pattan v Mid-Continent Sys Inc 841 F 2d 742 (7th Cir 1988). 
25 See eg First National Bank v Twombley 689 P 2d 1226 (Mont 1984); Tribby v 
Northwestern Bank 704 P 2d 409 (1985). 
26 Budget Rent-A-Car of Mo v B & G Rent-ACar Inc 619 S W 2d 832 (Mo Ct App 1981). 
27 720 P 2d 257 (Mont 1986). 
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expectation of continued employment so long as the employee's 
performance was satisfactory; (2) the implied contract of continued 
employment contained an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing; 
and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
would support a claim for both compensatory and punitive damages. If 
there had been a formal contract of employment, the employer might 
have been in a much better position because the employer could have 
relied on terms of the agreement itself to justify its actions. But in this 
circumstance the court implied an agreement where there was none, 
implied the terms of the agreement, and then found the defendant liable 
not only for compensatory damages but also for punitive damages which 
are usually awarded only for intentional misconduct. 
Montana is a sparsely populated state which has little impact on the 
main trends in commercial law. New York and a number of other states 
still adhere to a strict rule that employees at will are subject to discharge 
at any time with impunity.28 Nevertheless, the Flanigan case illustrates 
the strength of the good faith principle in American contract law. Using 
an implied duty of good faith in an implied contract to justify an award 
of punitive damages is a far cry from the suggestion by Justice (then 
Judge) Scalia that good faith is nothing more than the absence of 
bad faith. 
There are enough examples of the application of the good faith 
principle in American decisions to fill a rather substantial book. I have 
pointed out a few instances of the principle at work to indicate its 
strength, and to indicate that the common law has developed a sufficient 
number of precedents to provide substance and predictability. 
What is important for purposes of this conference and for useful 
commentary on John Carter's paper is that good faith has become a 
means for securing performance and for protecting against onerous 
enforcement of the provisions of a contract. A party who is expected to 
perform understands that a failure to perform according to reasonable 
expectations may be a breach of contract even if there has been technical 
compliance with the requirements of the agreement. 
In general the strength of the good faith principle is consistent with 
the basic idea that contracting parties exchange promises with the 
intention that each will perform. Many of the nuances of performance 
are based on mutual understanding founded on a continuing 
relationship. Performance may not be strictly according to the letter of 
the agreement; indeed, the natural interaction of the parties often leads 
to informal modifications. Contrary to the Objectivists who held sway 
around the turn of the century,29 the most important determinant in 
28 See eg Post v Regan 677 F Supp 203 at 206 (SD NY 1988) where the court stated that 
'An employer's unfettered right to discharge an at will employee is not to be unpaired 
by an implied covenant of good faith'. The employment at will doctrine is in flux in the 
United States and several states have adopted rules that provide some minimal job 
security for at-will employees, but the result in Flanigan remains at the outer limits. 
See generally H O Hunter, Modem Law of Contracts, 1986, ch 26, Cum Supp 1991-1. 
29 See eg the opinion of Justice Holmes in Globe Ref Co v Landa Cotton Oil Co 190 US 
540 (1903). 
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contract performance — and in the security of the performance — is the 
relationship of the parties to each other.30 
There remains an important question. How does the obligation of 
good faith interact with the doctrine of efficient breach and the 
fundamental tenet of freedom of contract that a party is free to decide 
not to perform subject to liability for damages? In principle there should 
be no conflict. If breach is less costly than performance a party is free to 
choose whether to perform. A difficulty may arise, however, if in their 
zeal to support the idea of good faith the courts follow too closely the 
'bad faith' insurance policy decisions and allow the recovery of 
extracontractual damages as the Montana courts did in the Flanigan case. 
That is a problem worth considering and worth separate attention in 
another paper. 
30 See eg C J Goetz and R E Scott, 'Principles of Relational Contracts', (1981) 67 Va L 
Rev 1089; MacNeil, 'The Many Futures of Contracts' (1974) 47 S Cal L Rev 691. 
